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In this paper I adopt a policy evaluation approach based on double di↵erence (or
di↵erence-in-di↵erence) techniques to test the hypothesis that the bidding prices of gen-
eration units change following a shift from public to private management. I draw on
bidding data and information concerning changes in management structures for the pe-
riod 2006 to 2017 in the Colombian wholesale electricity market.
The objectives of this paper are twofold. First, it seeks to contribute to empirical ev-
idence on the e↵ectiveness of reforms adopted in the electricity sector in the 1990s. The
aim here is to determine whether privatization is the right decision in an environment of
imperfect competition. Specifically, this study approaches privatization as a public pol-
icy program and assesses the e↵ect of a shift to private management on the competitive
behavior of electric power generators. I seek to answer the question: Is the price bidding
of generation units more aggressive after switching from public to private management?
Second, this study seeks to provide new insights into how private and public enterprises
compete in an oligopolistic environment. Specifically, I wish to determine whether the
empirical evidence is coherent with the theoretical models that study competition be-
tween private and public firms and those that study imperfect competition in electricity
markets.
In relation to the first of these objectives, it should be noted that privatization was
first adopted as an instrument for market liberalization in the electricity industry during
the reforms implemented in the 1990s. Several authors have studied the relationship
between market-oriented reforms and privatization, both theoretically (Roland, 2002;
Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987; Shapiro and Willig, 1990; Tirole, 1991) and empirically
(Frydman et al., 1999; La Porta and Lopez-de Silanes, 1999; Lopez-de Silanes et al.,
1997; Megginson and Netter, 2001).
Tirole (1991) concluded that a competitive market structure must necessarily precede
privatization. The argument is that although private firms pursue cost reduction, they
do not pursue a higher level of competition because this reduces their market power
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and, hence, their profits. In the specific case of electricity generation services, once the
possibilities of scope economies with other segments of the production chain and scale
economies had been ruled out, competition was introduced and privatization served as
a tool for ownership separation and the entry of new competitors (Green and Newbery,
1992; Newbery, 2005). And, moreover, once the reforms had produced markets based
on competition and price signals, the implicit promise of privatization was a reduction
in electricity generation costs. Furthermore, such a reduction would o↵set the strategic
component of potential unilateral market power.
Accordingly, thanks to the reforms, the final consumer observes more cost represen-
tative prices, and the overall e ciency of the sector improves (Joskow, 1998). However,
after more than 30 years of liberalization and privatization experiences, market power
issues of various kinds have been identified in many electricity markets (Joskow, 2008).
Several papers have focused on the e↵ects of liberalization and deregulation on elec-
tricity generation costs (Cicala, 2015; Davis and Wolfram, 2012; Fabrizio et al., 2007)
however, only the paper of MacKay and Mercadal (2020) have studied whether costs
reductions resulting from these reforms are traslated into lower prices. In this paper I
gather empirical evidence to establish whether private management has e↵ectively pro-
moted more competitive price bids, where ”competitive” is understood to mean more
cost reflective, and not necessarily lower, price bids. This study di↵ers from that carried
out by MacKay and Mercadal (2020) because these authors place their attention on ef-
fective deregulation of markets, while this document specifically emphasizes on the roll
of private management.
As for the second objective, it is worth stressing that the question studied herein
bridges two branches of literature: that of mixed oligopoly theory, which studies how
private and public companies interact in an environment of imperfect competition; and
that of empirical studies of comparison between public and private firms, which examine
the consequences of privatization in the framework of the wave of the reforms of utilities
in the 1980s and 1990s.
The main concerns of the mixed oligopoly literature have been (1) the optimal level
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of privatization (De Fraja and Delbono, 1989; Matsumura, 1998); (2) the role of public
enterprises as an instrument of economic policy (Beato and Mas-Colell, 1984; Cremer
et al., 1989); and (3) the incentive compatibility between the objectives of corporate
managers and shareholders of both private and public firms (Barros, 1995). However,
few papers have concerned themselves with the empirical di↵erences in strategic behavior
in a mixed oligopoly environment (Barros and Modesto, 1999).
On the other hand the empirical literature of comparison between state-owned and
privately-owned firms has mostly focused in their relative performance regarding e -
ciency and profitability (Frydman et al., 1999; La Porta and Lopez-de Silanes, 1999).
These studies aims to investigate whether the processes of privatization have been suc-
cessful in transforming former state owned enterprises into more e cient and more com-
petitive private enterprises (Megginson and Netter, 2001). However, in the majority of
cases these studies make comparisons without taking account if the form of production
is a natural monopoly or if the activity is subject to regulation. This paper contributes
to the literature because its approach adopt two novel elements. First, it is more focused
in behavioral di↵erences and allocative e ciency than in performance di↵erences and
productive e ciency. Second, it compares the behavior of private and public firms in an
environment in which they compete in a daily basis in the same relevant market. This
study aims to establish whether there is any coherence between the empirical evidence
and the behavioral di↵erences of public and private companies as identified by mixed
oligopoly models. It seeks to verify the congruence of the data with theoretical predic-
tions made about the bidding behavior of the firms, according to their forward contract
positions in the market (Green, 1999; Newbery, 1998).
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: the second section describes the main
features of the Colombian wholesale electricity market and the introduction of private
management structures the country’s electricity generation. The third section explains
the theoretical background underpinning the identification strategy used. The fourth
presents a general description of the data set, delineates the identification strategy and
discusses the suitability of the double di↵erence methodology. The fifth section presents
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the results of the application of the double di↵erence analysis to the price bids of the
generation units that switched from public to private management. In this section, I
also perform several robustness checks for di↵erent econometric alternatives. The final
part summarizes the results and presents my conclusions.
2 Institutional context
2.1 Colombian electricity market reforms
To understand how the Colombian electricity generation market is structured, we need
a clear overview of its institutional framework and of the direction taken by the sector’s
reforms implemented in the mid-1990s. The institutional structure of the Colombian
electricity sector clearly reflects the spirit of the 1991 Political Constitution and Laws
142 and 143 enacted in 1994. The Constitution adopted a new model of economic
development which, among other major features, opened up the public service sector
to private investment, establishing as basic principles, free entry and the introduction
of competition where possible. Based on this mandate, the electricity generation and
retailing segments were defined as competitive, while its transmission and distribution
services were defined as natural monopolies subject to regulation.
Electricity Law 143 of 1994 structured the sector’s generation activities around a
wholesale electricity market, organized in the form of a pool, in which generators are
able to sell their energy output via bilateral forward contracts or directly on the spot
market. The Colombian energy spot market operates as a first-price multi-product auc-
tion. Generators report a bid price per block of energy o↵ered to the market operator.
The aggregate supply curve is then constructed by organizing the generation units in
merit order (from the cheapest to the most expensive). The equilibrium price is the
minimum bid price at which the total demand for electricity can be met. All generators
bidding a price below the equilibrium price are dispatched and all are paid the marginal
price that clears the market. Electricity producers must bid a daily price for each of the
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generation units they have. For each hour of the day, the market operator determines
the price that balances the supply from the generators with total demand, and the units
that will be dispatched. Forward contracts between generators and traders, or those en-
tered into directly with final customers, are permitted. This system serves as a hedging
tool against market risk. The positive or negative di↵erences between the contracted
quantities and the quantities generated by each agent are settled at the spot price.
2.2 Transition from public to private management
As mentioned above, Public Service Law 142 and Electricity Law 143 ushered in reforms
to promote private enterprise in the electricity industry. The changes in the management
structures in the generation units studied herein can be accounted for in terms of privati-
zation processes and the ending of power purchase agreements (PPAs). Privatization in
the form of the sale of stakes in, or the transfer of assets from, public enterprises was not
exclusive to the energy sector. Private management policy formed part of other struc-
tural reforms oriented at opening up the Colombian economy. Privatization programs
were also initiated in manufacturing, natural gas, fuel distribution, water sanitization
and the banking industries. This, added to the separation of the activities of vertically
integrated public companies in the electricity industry, triggered a series of sales of gen-
eration assets. At the same time, central and municipal governments attracted private
investment for generation services via the signing of PPAs.
The main privatization sales of Colombian generation services occurred in two waves:
The first in the 1990s, before the period of analysis considered in this study, and the
second in the mid-2000s. The latter were related to the liquidation processes of the
vertically integrated companies that had already transferred their assets to other activ-
ities and in which only the assets of the generation segment remained to be disposed of.
At the beginning of the period of analysis, in 2006, the total installed capacity of the
Colombian generation market was 13.313 MW. At the end of the period of analysis, in
2017, it was 16.689 MW.
In 2007, the Pacific Energy Company (EPSA) became the new owner of the Prado
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Hydroelectric Power Plant (46 MW). This asset had previously been owned by the public
company, Gestion Energetica (GENSA). In 2008, the Colombian Investment Company,
Colinversiones (later CELSIA), acquired the assets and energy contracts of the Las Flo-
res Thermoelectric Power Plant (160 MW), previously under the control of the public
company, GECELCA. On June 30, 2010, the municipality-owned firm EMCALI sold
92% of the shares of the thermal unit Termoemcali I to the new private partners, TE
Holdings Colombia S.A.S (owned by the Infrastructure Fund Colombia Ashmore I) and
Maguro Ltd. The reason given by EMCALI for making this sale was to enable it to
make the necessary investments in drinking water and sanitation infrastructure.
Although privatization continued in the distribution segment, only one new privati-
zation was made in that of electricity generation in the years up to 2016. The Canadian
fund, Brookfield, acquired 57.6% of Isagen which had been the property of the national
government. The government’s argument for selling o↵ Isagen was to raise funds to
finance third-generation road projects. Isagen is Colombia’s second largest generator,
accumulating a total installed capacity of 3,032 MW, of which 2,732 MW are hydraulic
and 300 MW are thermal technologies. As for the PPAs, in 1995 the state-owned firm
CORELCA signed a PPA for the sale of the energy from the Termobarranquilla 3, Ter-
mobarranquilla 4 and TEBSA units. In 2006, the rights of the PPA were transferred to
the state-owned firm GECELCA due to the restructuring and liquidation of CORELCA.
Under the PPA contract, GECELCA was made responsible for the commercial manage-
ment in the wholesale electricity market of the energy generated by the aforementioned
units, although the property infrastructure remained the concern of the private firm
TEBSA. On April 21, 2016 the PPA was terminated and TEBSA began to participate
in direct sales in the wholesale energy market.
Based on these changes, it is apparent that the transition from public to private man-
agement of the generation units analyzed herein was part of a general restructuring of the
entire economic development model, in which the generation activity was just a modest
part. Moreover, the reasons o↵ered for the privatization or the change in management
often di↵ered and included such arguments as an attempt at restructuring firm processes,
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Table 1: Privatized Generation Units 2006-2017
Date Unit Technology Installed From To
Capacity State Owner Private Owner
(MW)
August 2007 Hidroprado Hydro 56 GENSA EPSA
August 2007 Prado IV Hydro 5.7 GENSA EPSA
November 2008 Termoflores Thermal, 150 GECELCA COLINVERSIONES
Gas fired,
combined cycle
June 2010 Termoemcali I Thermal, 213 EMCALI Holdings Col.,
Gas fired, Ashmore I,
combined cycle and Maguro LTD
January 2016 Calderas Hydro 26 ISAGEN ISAGEN
(57.6% Ministry (57.6% Brookfield
of Finance) Fund)
January 2016 Miel Hydro 396 ISAGEN ISAGEN
(57.6% Ministry (57.6% Brookfield
of Finance) Fund)
January 2016 Jaguas Hydro 170 ISAGEN ISAGEN
(57.6% Ministry (57.6% Brookfield
of Finance) Fund)
January 2016 San Carlos Hydro 1.240 ISAGEN ISAGEN
(57.6% Ministry (57.6% Brookfield
of Finance) Fund)
January 2016 Sogamoso Hydro 820 ISAGEN ISAGEN
(57.6% Ministry (57.6% Brookfield
of Finance) Fund)
January 2016 Termocentro Thermal, 300 ISAGEN ISAGEN
Gas fired, (57.6% Ministry (57.6% Brookfield
combined cycle of Finance) Fund)
April 2016 Termobarranquilla 3 Thermal, 64 GECELCA TEBSA
Gas fired,
simple cycle
April 2016 Termobarranquilla 4 Thermal, 63 GECELCA TEBSA
Gas fired,
simple cycle




funding strategic assets or terminating the PPAs. As such, these privatizations can be
considered exogenous to the interactions of competition in the wholesale market and to
the productive performance of these units. Table 1 lists the generation units that have
passed from state to private control in the twelve-year period of 2006 to 2017.
Given the processes of privatization and divestiture, the resulting ownership structure
of the main generation companies operating in Colombia is heterogeneous in terms of
the private or public nature of the main shareholders. The Colombian generation stock
has a high proportion of publicly owned or mixed companies that are under the control
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of public entities.
3 The mixed oligopoly model
This section presents various theoretical predictions of the e↵ects of private magement
on bidding strategies in electricity markets. I base my analysis on the extrapolation of
behavioral and cost assumuptions from mixed oligopoly studies to a simple model of best
response in the context of oligopoly competition in the electricity market.
Models of mixed oligopoly necessarily entail adopting di↵erent assumptions for pri-
vate and public firms. There are two basic types of di↵erence, and several models combine
them both: Namely, 1) Behavioral di↵erences, i.e. di↵erences in the objective function
of the firms. In most cases, the mixed oligopoly models assume that private firms aim to
maximize profits while the objective function of public (or mixed) firms is to maximize
social welfare; 2) Costs di↵erences, i.e. di↵erences in productive e ciency. Typically, it
is assumed that private firms operate at lower costs than public enterprises. From these
di↵erent assumptions, opposite e↵ects on pricing strategies and, hence, on competition,
can arise.
The analysis for profit maximizing firms builds on the theoretical arguments proposed
by (McRae and Wolak, 2009; Wolak, 2000). Assuming the firm has previously sold an
amount of energy qc
i
at a fixed price pc
i
by forward contracts, the profit function is defined




(qi)(qi   qci ) + pciqci   Ci(qi)
where ⇡i is the profit of the firm i, pRDi (.) is the inverse residual demand function of firm
i, qi is the quantity sold by firm i and Ci(.) is the total cost function of firm i. Note that
the market clearing price and the total cost are functions of the quantity. Given that
in electricity markets demand is necessarily equal to supply, at equilibrium the residual
demand of firm i is equal to the total quantity produced by this firm: RDi = qi. From
the first order conditions of the profit maximization problem, we can then obtain the
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This is the best response of a profit maximizing firm. The first term on the right-hand
side of this equation is the marginal cost and the second term is the strategic component.
The latter is equal to the interaction of the inverse of the slope of the residual demand
curve and the net forward contract position of the firm. Thus, the greater the amount of
energy sold by the firm through fixed price forward contracts, the lower the incentive to
increase the spot price. It should be noted that in cases where the generator is in a short
position, it has the incentive to exercise market power to reduce the price. This is the
expected behavior of a private firm which, according to the mixed oligopoly assumptions,
is profit maximizing.
Next, the welfare maximizing assumptions for public firms (which typify mixed
oligopoly theory) are extrapolated to this simple model of electricity markets and the
results compared to equation 1 so as to highlight the di↵erence between private and
































where p(x) is the inverse demand function, Q is the equilibrium total quantity and the
other variables are as described above. For convention’s sake, we identify the variables
of the public firm using the sub-index 0. The first three terms are the consumer surplus
and the remaining are the sum of industry profits. Note that the sum of the income from
the spot price and forward markets is simply a transfer from consumers to producers.














From the first order conditions of the maximization of this welfare function, the





This equation indicates that the best response for a welfare maximizing firm is to
apply the marginal cost pricing rule. This result is coherent with the findings of Beato
and Mas-Colell (1984) who demonstrated theoretically that a public firm is able to restore
market e ciency by applying this pricing rule.
Equations 1 and 2 allow two potential e↵ects of the change from public (welfare max-
imizing) to private (profit-maximization) management to be identified: the behavioral
and the cost e↵ects.
In the case of the behavioral e↵ect (marginal costs being equal), the comparison of
equations 1 and 2 leads to the conclusion that more cost reflective pricing (though, recall
not necessarily lower pricing) is achieved by public enterprises. Note that the di↵erence
between equations 1 and 2 is the strategic component. The sign of this component
depends on the di↵erence between the total quantity produced by the firm (qi) and its
total forward contract commitments (qc
i
). Moreover, the strategic component is relevant
only if the slope of the residual demand is steep enough, that is, if the new manager
has su cient market power. Hence, as far as the behavioral e↵ect is concerned, the
sign of the e↵ect of the change from public to private management will depend on the
contracting levels of the firms and their market power. For high (low) contracting levels,
a negative (positive) e↵ect is expected. The greater the market power enjoyed by the
firm, the greater the magnitude of these e↵ects.
In the case of the cost e↵ect (assuming identical behavior of both private and public
firms), the canonical assumption of mixed oligopoly models of a more cost e↵ective





, leads to the conclusion of a pro-competitive
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e↵ect of private management that necessarily entails lower equilibrium prices.1 In this
scenario, the e↵ect of switching from public to private management would be expected
to lead to a decrease in price bidding.
In subsection 4.2, I explain the strategy for disentangling these e↵ects and in section
5 I present the results.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Data
I assess the impact of private management on the bidding prices of generation units in
Colombia by using data from the wholesale electricity market. The data set contains
the daily observations of 65 generation units, owned by 25 generation firms, during the
period January 2006 to December 2017. Note I only include the generation units that
bid prices in the wholesale electricity market.2 In addition, there are several units that
ceased to operate and others which started operations during the period of analysis.
Hence, the data constitute an unbalanced panel of 348.331 observations.
Information about daily price bids, commercial availability and sales in forward con-
tracts (requisite information for computing the forward contract level of the unit’s owner)
was extracted from the website of the Colombian wholesale electricity market operator,
XM. Information about changes to the administrative structures of the generation units
(see table 1) was extracted from press releases and the websites of the current owners.
As a time varying control variable, an estimation of the marginal costs of the generation
units was used. Table 2 highlights the main descriptive statistics of each of the variables
1Several theories seek to disentangle the source of the cost discrepancy between private and pub-
lic firms. Such studies are oriented towards examining regulated private firms (Shapiro and Willig,
1990), the e↵ects of transition from centrally planned to market-based economies (Roland, 2002; Tirole,
1991) and the role of transaction costs on the production of private and public firms (Sappington and
Stiglitz, 1987). Similarly, a large number of studies have been devoted to finding empirical evidence for
this discrepancy. Although the evidence is contradictory, many of these studies identify improvements
in performance following privatization (Frydman et al., 1999; La Porta and Lopez-de Silanes, 1999;
Megginson and Netter, 2001).
2Small units (generation capacity less than 20MW) are incorporated automatically as base generation.
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Table 2: Variables in the econometric model
Variable Units Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Bid Price (b) Pesos/KWh 348331 403.32 451.98 37.06 22552.48
Logarithm Bid Price (Ln(b)) Ln(Pesos/KWh) 348331 5.51 1.01 3.61 10.02
Marginal Costs (C) Pesos/KWh 348331 40.32 49.93 0.00 443.90
Daily Commercial Availability (A) GWh 348331 30.14 24.04 0.00 75.22
Daily Forward Contracts (F ) GWh 348331 14.81 13.22 0.00 52.10
Index of contracting (IC) Percentage 343860 51.78 23768.57 0.00 1.33E+07
Indicator of under contracting (L) Dummy 343860 0.88 0.33 0.00 1.00
Indicator of over contracting (H) Dummy 343860 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
Control Group
Variable Units Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Bid Price (b) Pesos/KWh 277288 401.53 449.75 37.06 22552.48
Logarithm Bid Price (Ln(b)) Ln(Pesos/KWh) 277288 5.51 1.01 3.61 10.02
Marginal Costs (C) Pesos/KWh 277288 41.97 50.55 0.00 443.90
Daily Commercial Availability (A) GWh 277288 30.24 25.57 0.00 75.22
Daily Forward Contracts (F ) GWh 277288 14.99 13.89 0.00 52.10
Index of contracting (IC) Percentage 273227 65.05 26664.41 0.00 1.33E+07
Indicator of under contracting (L) Dummy 273227 0.85 0.36 0.00 1.00
Indicator of over contracting (H) Dummy 273227 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
Treated Group
Variable Units Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Bid Price (b) Pesos/KWh 71043 410.31 460.51 40.57 12387.83
Logarithm Bid Price (Ln(b)) Ln(Pesos/KWh) 71043 5.53 1.01 3.70 9.42
Marginal Costs (C) Pesos/KWh 71043 33.91 46.87 0.00 420.11
Daily Commercial Availability (A) GWh 71043 29.76 16.83 0.00 69.70
Daily Forward Contracts (F ) GWh 71043 14.10 10.13 0.00 35.91
Index of contracting (IC) Percentage 70633 0.45 0.67 0.00 155.98
Indicator of under contracting (L) Dummy 70633 0.98 0.13 0.00 1.00
Indicator of over contracting (H) Dummy 70633 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00
Source: XM - Colombian Market Operator
included in the model.
For marginal costs estimation I assume an accounting approach similar to that as-
sumed in previous studies in the field of electricity markets (Borenstein and Bushnell,
1999; Borenstein et al., 2002; Fabra and Reguant, 2014; Green and Newbery, 1992;
Wolak, 2000; Wolfram, 1998, 1999). I computed the marginal costs of thermal plants
taking into account their technical parameters (heat rate), fuel costs and fuel transporta-
tion costs. The sources of the information and more detailed information concerning the
assumptions for the calculation and imputation of these costs are presented in appendix
C. It is important to bear in mind that these computations may contain some measure-
ment error given that we approximate the fuel costs to references prices, and the cost
per unit in the actual fuel supply contracts may be di↵erent. For hydroelectric genera-
tion units, a marginal cost equal to zero is assumed. Even when this assumption may
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appear to be unrealistic, the use of unit fixed e↵ects and date fixed e↵ects in the esti-
mation ensures I can control for time invariant heterogeneity and common time variant
factors. The validity of the result relies on the assumption that the expectation of the
time variant heterogeneity component of the marginal costs is zero.
4.2 Identification strategy
This paper examines private management from the perspective of the evaluation of policy
impact. The di↵erences-in-di↵erences methodology with staggered adoption undertakes
a comparison of treated and non-treated (control) groups before and after policy inter-
vention in a context in which the date of treatment may vary by unit. Specifically, in
this paper, the generation units that switched from public to private management make
up the treated group while the public generation units constitute the control group. The
estimation of the impact of private management on bidding prices, using this methodol-
ogy, relies on the assumption that the average change between pre- and post-treatment
periods on bidding prices of the units that remained public throughout the period is an
unbiased estimator of the average change in bidding prices of the treated units had they
continued to be managed by public companies. This in turn entails that the unobserved
time variant heterogeneity of the estimation model is uncorrelated with the switch in
management structures. A major concern in the application of double di↵erences is the
possibility that treatment and control groups may di↵er in their pre-existing character-
istics resulting, in this instance, in di↵erent bidding price strategies even if the former
had not undergone private managed. Specifically, generation units may di↵er in two
key features: i) technological characteristics, such as fuel type, installed capacity and
potential for supplying auxiliary services; and ii) the forward contract exposure position
of the unit’s owner. Di↵erent initial conditions with regard to these characteristics could
account for the di↵erent time paths of the treatment and control groups, rather than
the switch to private management. In order to address this concern, in the base line
estimation, I apply matching methods in order to pair observations from the treatment
group with similar observations in the control, given several observable initial charac-
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teristics. First, the criteria for considering the plants in the treated and control groups
as similar need to be established. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) proposed calculating
the probability of being treated conditional on the individuals’ pretreatment observable
characteristics and, then, using this probability (propensity score) as criteria for match-
ing observations. In the framework of this research, I calculate the propensity score with















is the probability of switching from public to private management
conditional to the observable variables, Ti is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the unit
was switched to private management during the period of analysis and 0 otherwise,  (.)
is the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal and Xi is a set of key
pretreatment observable characteristics: the type of fuel used by the unit, the potential
for supplying an automatic generation control service, the installed capacity, the expected
daily amount of energy which the unit can supply in hydro critical conditions, and the
average contract position of the firm in the years 2005 and 2006, prior to any privatization
process analyzed in this study.
Having calculated the propensity score, I considered as control group those units that
did not switch to private management and lie in the common support region, i.e. the
public plants for which the probability of their being privatized is positive, according to
the probability distribution associated with the propensity score model. The observa-
tions of units that did not switch management to private and are outside the common
support were dropped. In the robustness checks subsection 5.2, I examine the results
of the estimation without applying propensity score matching and using more stringent
matching criteria, such as nearest neighbor.
As stated above, the first objective of this empirical analysis is to establish whether
private management has a significant e↵ect on the bidding price and, if so, its magni-
tude. The second objective is to identify the drivers of the potential changes by exploiting
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information about forward contracts in the Colombian wholesale electricity market. Fi-
nally, the paper explores the features of the dynamic e↵ect of privatization, understood
as the duration, trend and variability of the impact over time. In order to tackle the
first objective of this paper, i.e. to establish the net average e↵ect of privatization on
bidding prices, I propose estimating the following two-way fixed e↵ects linear regression
model:






+  i +  t + ✏it (3)
where bit is the level or logarithm of the daily bidding price submitted by unit i in the day
t ; Dit is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when unit i is privately managed
on the day t ; xk
it
is a vector of time variant heterogeneous variables, in this case the
marginal cost; i is a generation unit fixed e↵ect that controls for non-observable time
invariant heterogeneity; and  t is a date fixed e↵ect which controls for the common time
variability. Finally, ✏it is the generation unit time-varying error, which is assumed to
be uncorrelated with Dit and the vector Xit. Note that in the base line estimation, the
control group consists of the public generation units; hence,Dit takes the value of one
after unit i switched to private management. The parameter 1 represents the double
di↵erence e↵ect of the change from public to private on price bids. The logarithmic
specification of the dependent variable facilitates interpretation of this parameter as a
percentage change.
Second, section 3 argued that the behavioral e↵ect on the bidding strategy of a
change in management depends on the capacity of private managers to use their market
power. To capture this heterogeneity, the treatment group is split in two subgroups: i)
The first includes the units that changed to being a large private incumbent and ii) the
second includes the units that changed to being a new private competitor in the market.
Note that the management changes a↵ecting the first group entail an increase in market
concentration while those a↵ecting the second decrease it. Hence, the distinction between
the two subgroups is based on the presumption that large private incumbents increase
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their market power with a change of management while new competitors do not.
In order to capture these di↵erences in behavioral reaction due to market power, I
propose estimating the following two-way fixed e↵ects linear regression model:






+  i +  t + ✏it (4)
where Bigit is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when unit i is privately
managed by a big incumbent private firm on the day t and zero otherwise. Newit is a
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when unit i is privately managed by a new
competitor in the market in day t and zero otherwise. The remaining variables have the
same meaning as in equation 3.
Third, to identify the coherence of the e↵ect of private management due to behav-
ioral changes and the theoretical predictions presented in section 3, it should be borne
in mind that in the case of the Colombian market the information about the forward
contract position of the electricity generator is observable for the econometrician. This
makes it possible to identify two di↵erent impacts of private management (parameters)
corresponding to the di↵erent requirements of forward contracts. To capture any di↵er-
ences, I created two dummy variables corresponding to high and low levels of forward
contracting, i.e. the dummy variable Lit (Hit), takes the value of one if the owner of the
unit has a low (high) level of forward contracts, and zero otherwise . In order to consider
the forward contracting position of a firm as low or high, I calculate an indicator for the
level of contracting based on the hourly information of forward contracts and commercial













where Fjth is the amount of energy committed in forward contracts in in hour h of day
t, for firm j. Aijth is the commercial availability of unit i owned by firm j in hour h of
day t. Nj is the number of units owned by firm j. I calculate the index of contracting





This can be interpreted as the fraction of the daily commercial availability of a firm
that is committed to forward contracts. I consider the contracting position of a firm as
high (low) when the value of the ICjt of firm j is greater (less) than the average ICjt of
private firms prior to the first period of treatment. Here, this value is 0.26. Subsequently,
I apply each of these contract position dummies to the treatment dummy, replacing the
unique treatment variable for its interactions with each of the contract position dummy
variables. Accordingly, I estimate the following two-way fixed e↵ects model:






+  i +  t + ✏it (5)
where Lit is the low contracting position dummy, Hit is the high contracting position
dummy,xk
it
is a vector of observed time variant variables that can a↵ect the price bids of
unit i on day t : marginal costs and forward contracting. The remaining variables are the
same as in equation 3. Table 2 shows that the ICjt for the control group presents notable
outliers. These outliers are attributable to the extremely low values of the denominator.
For this reason, I opt to exclude the observations for which the Ajt is less than 5% of
the maximum Ajt for firm j, that is, I exclude the observations if Ajt < 0, 05 ·max
t
(Ajt).
Concerning the validity of the results of the models estimated in equations 3, 4 and
5, a key assumption is the lack of significant changes in marginal costs or in the strategic
component due to time variant unobservable heterogeneity attributable to other events
that might alter the relative bidding behavior of the firms around the time they switched
to private management. Specifically, a major El Niño event occurred between November
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2014 and May 2016.3 This period coincides with two shifts in management structure:
the sale of ISAGEN shares and the finalization of the PPA signed with the TEBSA. In
the following sections, I present evidence to show that the occurrence of this event does
not invalidate the results.
4.3 Parallel trends
As discussed above, the correct identification of the e↵ect of a management switch using
the double di↵erence estimator relies on the assumption that the average bidding prices
of public generation units in post-private management periods are an unbiased estimator
of the average bidding prices of the privatized units had they not been privatized. Given
the impossibility of obtaining data for this counter-factual, statistical testing of this
assumption is not feasible. However, the recent literature on the use of double di↵erences
performs statistical tests of parallel trends in the dependent variable between treatment
and control groups prior to the intervention. To do likewise, I compare the bidding price
of public generation units with the average bidding price of the units that were privatized
prior to this change (treated before treatment - TBT group).
First, I carry out a graphical analysis to identify any marked di↵erences. The graphs
in figure 1 show the monthly average bid (panel a) and bid logarithm (panel b) for both
the control and treatment groups prior to private management. Both series are noisy
and it is not possible to identify clear di↵erences between the time trends of each group
simply by inspection. As for the potential e↵ect of the 2014-2016 El Niño event, no clear
break can be identified in the di↵erences presented by the two series during this period.
Second, I implement a fixed e↵ects regression, taking as independent variables the
interactions of the linear and quadratic time trends and dummies for the control group
and the TBT group, i.e.:
bit =  0 +  
T
1 D
T · T +  T2 DT · T 2 +  NT1 DNT · T +  NT2 DNT · T 2 +  i + ✏it
3The drop in rainfall caused by the El Niño phenomenon has a significantly negative impact on the
availability of hydro generation resources. This translates into significant price changes on the wholesale
energy market.
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Figure 1: Time series treatment and control groups
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Source: Data from XM - Elaboration: Author.
where T is the linear time trend, DT is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when
unit i is in the group of units that are to be private managed ; DNT is a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 when unit i is in the group of non-switched units that remain
public throughout the period of analysis and the remaining variables are the same as
in equation 3. Later, I tested the null hypothesis: Ho:  T1 =  
NT





Table A5 in appendix A shows the results.
The coe cients for both interactions point to a very uncertain estimation and the
test for equality of coe cients indicates that there is no statistical evidence of di↵erences
between the two groups.
Finally, given that the parallel trend assumption should be met in relation to the
moment of application of the policy and that I have di↵erent dates for the switch in
management structures, I checked the relevance of di↵erences between the treatment
and control groups for the 72 months prior to the treatment date. I adopt a monthly
version of the approach suggested by Galiani et al. (2005). This involves performing a
two-way fixed e↵ect estimation of the panel data, including dummy variables for each
group (control and TBT), for each lag period. In this case, I estimated a coe cient for
each group for the 72 months prior to the change to private management. The model
estimated is:
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+  t +  i + ✏it (6)
where DT
l
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the unit i is in the group
of units that are going to switch from public to private and the day t is in the l month
previous to the switch to private. The remaining variables have the same meaning as
in equation 3. For this regression it was necessary to drop the treated observations in
the post-treatment period. Figure 2 presents the results of the test for the di↵erences of
non-switched and switched to private groups, for each lag of the month to the treatment
date.
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Overall, it is only possible to reject the null hypothesis of a di↵erence equal to zero
in less than 10% of the months prior to treatment. As for the potential e↵ect of the
El Niño event, the pretreatment period is su ciently long to capture di↵erences in the
series before and after the onset of the 2014-2016 event. The onset of the El Niño
phenomenon is around 14 to 17 months prior to changes in the management of ISAGEN
and TEBSA. There are no major changes in the di↵erences observed between the treated
and control groups in the months coinciding with this El Niño event. This suggests that
the climatic event did not influence the di↵erence in average bidding prices between the
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control and treatment groups. Based on these results, the assumption of parallel trends
of the treatment and control groups seems reasonable.
5 Results
5.1 Baseline estimation
In this section the double di↵erence models described in subsection 4.2 above are applied
to the data set for the wholesale electricity market in Colombia. Given the large number
of time controls applied, I adopted the procedure for estimating high-dimensional fixed
e↵ects models proposed in Correia (2017). Table 3 displays the results of the baseline
estimate of the models in expressions 3 and 4.
It is evident that the general e↵ect of switching to private management on price
bids is economically important but highly uncertain. For all the treated generation
units I found an increasing e↵ect around the 20% of the bidding price. However, when
distinguishing between the changes to large incumbents and those to new competitors,
a marked positive economic impact on the bidding strategy of the latter group can be
observed. This impact reaches around the 90% of increase of the bidding price. The
e↵ect of the entry of new private competitors is economically non-significant and highly
uncertain, the percentage increase in the bidding price related with it is around 3%.
These results suggest that the strategic component related to market power matters.
In relation to the dynamic e↵ects of private management, I explored the duration,
trend and stability of the impact around the time of the switch from public to pri-
vate management. To do so, I created a treatment dummy variable for each of the 24
months before and after the change in management structure, according to the following
modification of the model proposed in expression 3:
bit =  0 +
24X
l= 24






+  i +  t + ✏it (7)
where ↵l is the average impact l months before (or after) private management, Zitl is a
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Table 3: Impact of private management - Bid price and Logarithm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bid Bid Bid Bid Ln (Bid) Ln (Bid) Ln (Bid) Ln (Bid)
Change to 86.730 0.183
Private (68.794) (0.119)
Ch. to P. 339.560*** 358.829*** 0.653*** 0.642***
Small to big (88.854) (59.207) (0.162) (0.117)
Ch. to P. -30.361 -4.622 0.014 0.029
New comp. (42.538) (53.015) (0.106) (0.111)
Marginal Costs -2.414*** -1.847 -2.794*** -2.332** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.007***
(0.846) (1.110) (0.870) (0.882) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Unit FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Date FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 90874 54683 81409 90874 90874 54683 81409 90874
R-sq 0.360 0.360 0.441 0.368 0.556 0.539 0.593 0.560
Note: Statistical significance at standard levels (*** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%).
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by generation unit.
dummy that takes the value of one if unit i in moment t switched to private management
l months before (or after). The remaining variables and parameters are the same as those
in equation 3. The results of the estimation of this model for the logarithm of the bidding
price are presented in figure 3.4
In the estimation that does not discriminate between large incumbents and new
competitors, a clear positive jump can be seen in the month of the switch to private
management, which is statistically significant for the first three months. After this, the
e↵ect slowly decreases and even becomes negative after 15 months. This suggests that
although the average impact of the shift from public to private management is positive
and statistically significant in the short run (first three months), this impact decreases in
the long run and exhibits a clear decreasing trend over time. These results can be inter-
preted in relation to the hypothesis that privatization may yield cost savings because of
the greater e ciency achieved in the management of operations and contractual negoti-
ations by private companies. The changes associated with these factors can be expected
4The results for the bidding price as dependent variable are presented in panels a, b and c of figure
B5 in appendix B.
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to be gradual, stable and, eventually, to reach a point of exhaustion. Assuming that
privately managed firms expect to become net sellers of energy, the pattern presented
in figure 3 is congruent with the hypothesis of an initial counter-competitive strategic
impact that is gradually o↵set by the greater cost reductions implemented by the private
manager.5 This scenario supports the hypothesis that both components are relevant for
explaining the di↵erences in bidding prices between private and public enterprises.
However, this narrative presumes that firms managed privately expect to achieve
positive net sales of energy on the wholesale market. For this reason, I performed
additional estimates corresponding to two di↵erent impacts depending on the level of
forward contracting (low or high) of the owner of the generation unit. In this way, I
am able to verify the coherence of the results with the predictions of equations 1 and 2
discussed in section 3. Table 4 shows the results of the estimation of the model applied
to specific situations in which the private owners of the treated units have low or high
forward sales, as stated in expression 4 in subsection 4.2.
In the case of firms with low levels of forward contracting , columns 1 and 5 in table
4 show an economically significant positive e↵ect with low levels of uncertainty. When
the treatment group is split between large incumbents and new competitors, although
I found the expected e↵ect for both subgroups, that of the former was greater and less
uncertain than the e↵ect of the latter.
According to these results, when producers face low levels of forward contracting, the
privatization of generation units leads to an increase in bidding prices. These results are
consistent with the theoretical predictions of the model of incentives to exercise market
power proposed by Wolak (2000, 2003).
In contrast, in the case of situations of high levels of forward contracting, a negative
net average e↵ect of private management on bidding prices can be detected. This is eco-
nomically relevant with low levels of uncertainty for the whole sample and the subgroups
of large incumbents and new competitors.
Given these results, we incorporate the level of forward contracting in the analysis
5Note the average ICit for private firms during the analysis period is 0.37.
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Table 4: Impact of private management and forward contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bid Bid Bid Bid Ln (Bid) Ln (Bid) Ln (Bid) Ln (Bid)
Ch. to P./C. Low 177.05* 0.38**
(86.57) (0.15)
Ch. to P./C. High -190.52* -0.46***
(100.66) (0.15)
Ch. to P./C. Low 402.67*** 419.91*** 0.76*** 0.75***
Small to big (111.19) (83.43) (0.18) (0.13)
Ch. to P./C. High -149.42* -155.92* -0.34** -0.33**
Small to big (77.23) (80.51) (0.13) (0.14)
Ch. to P./C. Low 78.57 91.69 0.29 0.29
New comp. (100.89) (98.14) (0.22) (0.22)
Ch. to P./C. High -210.89 -189.40 -0.57** -0.54**
New comp. (175.82) (174.82) (0.26) (0.26)
Contracts Low 61.59 76.43 66.99 60.11 0.30 0.35 0.31 0.30
(68.00) (65.97) (58.61) (60.68) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19)
Marginal Costs -2.93*** -2.25** -3.33*** -2.84** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***
(0.93) (0.90) (1.04) (1.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Unit FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Date FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 89607 53484 80174 89607 89607 53484 80174 89607
R-sq 0.36 0.34 0.44 0.36 0.56 0.53 0.59 0.56
Note: Statistical significance at standard levels (*** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%).
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by generation unit.
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of duration, trend and stability of the impact for the 24-month period either side of the
switch to private management. Thus, I interacted the variables of low (Lit) and high
(Hit) levels of contracting with the lags/leads (Zitl) both 24 months before and after the
change in management structure, according to the following modification of the model
expressed in equation 5:

















it +  i +  t + ✏it (8)
where ↵L
l
is the average impact l semesters after (or before) private management with
low levels of contracting, ↵H
l
is the average impact l semesters after (or before) private
management with high levels of contracting. xk
it
is a vector of time variant observed
variables that are not common to all the units: marginal costs and forward contracting.
The remaining variables are the same as those in expression 5. I perform this estimation
for the whole sample and for the sub-samples of large incumbents and new competitors.
Figure 4 presents the results for the estimation of the logarithmic model.6
Regarding the estimation for the whole sample, in the months previous to the switch
to private management there is no a clear di↵erences in the pattern of bidding between
low and high forward contracting episodes. After private management, the coe cients
for low contracting locate systematically in the positive region and the coe cients for
high contracting locate in the negative region.
The bidding pattern corresponding to days of low levels of contracting locates in
the positive region immediately after the change to private management. As in the
estimation of the model in expression 7 (which does not consider forward contracting),
the first three months of private management present positive coe cients with low levels
of uncertainty. In the case of bids made during days of high forward contracting, it is
evident that following the change to private management the coe cients locate in the
6The results for the model with bids as the dependent variable are presented in panels d, e and f of
figure B5 in appendix B. Although the results are more uncertain, the model presents the same patterns
as those of the logarithmic model.
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negative segment. Although the first four months are uncertain and close to zero, in
subsequent months these coe cients present more markedly negative values. When the
sample is split between the large incumbents and new competitors, two di↵erent patterns
are observed and it is evident that the general pattern observed in panel a of figure 4 is
driven by that of the new competitors.
Prior to private management, the first subgroup shows negative di↵erences with re-
spect to the control group, especially on days of low levels of forward contracting. During
the first three months of private management, the bids jump to reach positive and statis-
tically significant values for both high and low forward contracting positions. During the
first nine months of private management, the bidding strategy in both forward contract-
ing positions seems to follow the same pattern. After the ninth month, the coe cients
no longer present a clear pattern. In contrast, the group of new competitors present an
unequivocal pattern of di↵erent bidding strategies depending on the forward contracting
position. As predicted by the theory of incentives to exercise market power, private
managers increase their bids when their contract obligations are low and decrease their
bids when contract obligations are high. These results indicate that the firms’ level of
forward contracting is a key element in understanding the bidding strategy of privately
managed firms and the di↵erences in relation to the bidding behavior of public firms.
In addition, these findings allow me to clarify the explanation for the patterns found
in figure 3 and the hypothesis of initial counter-competitive e↵ects and subsequent cost
reduction attributable to the change to private management.
The findings in table 4 and panels a and c of figure 4 show that the pattern found
in figure 3 reflects the composite e↵ect of two strategies: The bidding behavior on days
of low levels of forward contracting and the behavior on days of high levels of forward
contracting. These results support the hypothesis that the reduction in average bid-
ding prices several months after the switch to private management can be attributed to
strategic behavior rather than to a reduction in costs.
Given the rigorous time fixed e↵ect controls applied to the estimations, the fact that
the reduction in bidding price is well explained by high levels of forward contracting
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is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the driving factor of the decline in bid prices
following private management is the gradual reduction in costs. It should be noted
that the estimated magnitude of the increase in bidding prices for days of low levels of
contracting — c. 38% — and that of the decrease for days of high levels — c. 46%
— are economically significant. It is implausible that such changes are attributable to
a cost di↵erence generated by improvements in the operative management of the units
and a more e cient negotiation of fuel contracts. Studies that evaluate the impact of
the implementation of liberalization on productive performance in electricity markets
suggest that e↵ects of this type are modest. Fabrizio et al. (2007) assessed the impacts
of liberalization on the e ciency of thermal power plants in the US. They found e ciency
gains from liberalization of around 3 to 12% for labor and non-fuel inputs. Davis and
Wolfram (2012) evaluated the impacts of liberalization on the operating performance of
nuclear plants in the US. These authors conclude that deregulation and consolidation are
associated with a 10% increase in operating performance, achieved primarily by reducing
the duration of reactor outages. Cicala (2015) found a fall of around 12% in the price
paid for coal by deregulated generation firms after the end of cost-of-service regulation.
In contrast, the evidence found after incorporating the information of forward con-
tracting is consistent with the theory of incentives to exert market power in electricity
markets outlined in section 3. This predicts that the coe cient should exhibit opposite
signs in di↵erent contract positions.
5.2 Robustness Checks
The results presented above may, however, be dependent on the particular specification
of the econometric model employed. In this section I present several estimations to
test the impact of changes in these specifications. Overall, the qualitative results of the
model seem to be robust to the di↵erent changes. First, I estimated the model under the
assumption of random unobserved heterogeneity. I performed a generalized least squares
regression applying fixed e↵ects for every week of the sample with robust standard errors
clustered by unit. The results are available in table D8 in online appendix D. Second, in
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addition to propensity score matching, another strategy for controlling for pre-existing
time invariant characteristics is to allow for the inclusion of time invariant observable
control variables that may lead to di↵erent time paths for the treatment and control
groups. Bernardo (2018) performed an estimation of a Prais-Winsten pooled regression
model which assumes an autoregressive process of order 1 and heteroscedasticity in the
error term. Although this specification may be biased by unobserved time invariant
heterogeneity, it allows time invariant observable control variables or initial conditions
to be included, which may lead to di↵erent time paths for the treatment and control
groups. I performed this type of estimation avoiding the use of the propensity score
matching but including the following control variables: the type of fuel of the unit, the
potential for supplying an automatic generation control service, the installed capacity,
the daily amount of energy that the unit can supply in hydro critical conditions and the
average contract position of the firm in the years 2005 and 2006, prior to any switching
process from public to private management analyzed in this study. The results can be
consulted in table D9 in online appendix D.
Third, in the baseline estimation, I applied a matching method, using as pairing
criteria the common support resulting from the propensity score matching procedure. I
performed several checks employing with this methodology. First, I estimated the whole
sample again but ignored the results of the propensity score matching. The results for
the estimation of models of expressions 3 and 4 can be consulted in table D10 in online
appendix D. The results for the dynamic e↵ects of the switch to private management
are available in figure D7 in appendix D. The second robustness check related to the
matching methodology concerns the estimation model of the propensity score. I repeated
this estimation using a logit model to calculate the propensity score. The matching
results were identical. Likewise, I performed the estimation of the propensity score using
all the data as a pooled data panel. (The results can be consulted in table D11 in
online appendix D). As a third check, I modified the criterion in order to match the
observations of the treatment and control groups. Instead of using the common support
of the propensity score, I considered the nearest neighbor algorithm. This seeks to
30
identify the control observation with the closest propensity score for every privatized
unit. The observations that are not matched can then be dropped. The results using
the nearest neighbor criterion to select the control group are available in table D12 in
online appendix D.
Fourth, price bid information is available for private and public firms, which means
other control groups may be considered, such as: i) any units owned by the central
government that did not change managers during the time analyzed; ii) any units that
did not change their managers during the time analyzed regardless of their ownership
type. I took these unit sets as control groups and repeated the parallel trend tests and
the baseline estimation. The results are available in figure D6 in appendix D. For both
sets of unit, the parallel trend tests indicate that this is a reasonable assumption. The
results of the estimation of the models in equations 3 and 4 when using these di↵erent
control groups can be consulted in tables D14 and D14 in online appendix D. I also
performed an estimation of the dynamic e↵ects of the switch to private management for
both samples. The results are available in figures D8 and D9 in the online appendix D,
respectively. The results of the checks described above were robust and similar to the
baseline estimation.
Finally, for the baseline estimation, I performed fixed e↵ects estimations with robust
standard errors clustered by each generation unit. However, Bertrand et al. (2004)
showed that serial correlation in double di↵erence applications may distort the inference,
even using robust standard errors. In order to explore the possibility of serial correlation
issues provoking false positive e↵ects in units and periods in which switching to private
management did not occur, I performed several placebo tests. To check the potentially
significant results on non-treated plants, I dropped the observations of treated units and
applied a fictional random treatment to the non-treated sample according to di↵erent
probabilities of fictional treatment (25, 50 and 75%). Later, I estimated the impact for
each of the probabilities assigned. The date of treatment is random and di↵ers for each
unit. The results of the estimation are shown in table B6 in appendix B. As expected,
for samples in which fictional treatment is applied with probabilities of 50 and 75%, the
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interest coe cients are not statistically significant at conventional confidence levels. In
the case of a fictional treatment being applied with a probability of 25%, statistically
significant coe cients are obtained. Although opposite signs (negative) to those found
in the baseline estimation are exhibited, this result warns of a potential problem of
over-rejection of the null hypothesis. In order to check the robustness of the baseline
estimation against this potential inferential problem, I allowed for arbitrary variance-
covariance matrix within units. Athey and Imbens (2018) suggest that, in the context of
di↵erence in di↵erence settings with staggered adoption, the clustered bootstrap variance
estimator is conservative. I estimated the models specified in equations 3 and 4 applying
fixed e↵ects for every week of the sample and block-bootstrapping methods. The results
are shown in table B7 in appendix B. The statistical significance of the coe cients and the
extent of uncertainty in the inference are similar to those in the baseline estimation. This
is an indication that the inference in the baseline estimation is not a↵ected by marked
biases. However, given the data’s long time dimension, the results of the di↵erence-in-
di↵erences estimations performed in this paper should be treated with caution.
The results presented in this section suggest that the baseline estimation presented
in subsection 5.1 is robust to di↵erent sample alternatives and other specifications of the
model. However, given the data’s high number of time periods I should stress that serial
correlation biases of the standard error estimates may well arise.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, I have undertaken a policy evaluation of the impact of the switch from
public to private management structures of electricity generation units on the bidding
strategy of firms in the Colombian wholesale electricity generation market. This empiri-
cal exercise has sought to address two goals: i) a determination of the net average impact
on price bids and ii) an analysis of the coherence of the empirical evidence with the the-
ory of incentives to exercise market power in electricity markets in a mixed oligopoly
framework. I drew on daily information on bidding strategies and assumed the switch to
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private management of several units as being an exogenous decision in order to perform
a double di↵erence analysis, in which the public units are the control group and those
switching to private management constitute the treatment group.
The positive impact of private management was found to be statistically significant
for situations in which the firms faced short forward contract positions, while for those
facing long positions, the results are also statistically significant, but the sign of the
e↵ect is negative, and the magnitude of the coe cients are economically relevant. These
findings are intuitive with regards to the model of incentives to exercise market power
in the electricity market. I analyzed the dynamics of the impact of the switch to pri-
vate management on bid pricing and found that the pattern of the impacts presents a
decreasing e↵ect on days of low forward contracting and an increase on days of high
forward contracting. These e↵ects are sudden following the change of management, with
high variability and no clear tendency to disappear.
Given the magnitude of the impact, the link between the marginal costs of electricity
generation and time invariant factors, and the empirical evidence that contradicts the
hypothesis of the better cost performance of public enterprises compared to that of
private firms, these findings are suggestive of a relevant change in strategic behavior
when the units are switched from public administration to private management. These
findings suggest that private firms are sensitive to the incentives to exercise market
power, while public enterprises are less sensitive.
This empirical finding is coherent with the mixed oligopoly theory, which in line
with the assumption of welfare maximizing behavior deduces that public firms apply the
marginal cost pricing rule. This is not surprising in the case of electricity generation
in Colombia given that the Ministry of Energy sits on the management boards of the
majority of public generation firms. The price of electricity is the subject of intense
political debate and one that can have a vital impact on the welfare of consumers and
the competitiveness of energy intensive industries.
However, there are alternative explanations that lie outside the scope of the present
paper. Hortaçsu and Puller (2008) observed that small sellers formulate less refined bid
33
strategies than big firms and Hortaçsu et al. (2019) found that firm size and manager
education improves the sophistication of firms’ strategies. Extrapolating this finding to
privately and publicly managed firms, the trend towards the strategic profit maximiza-
tion bids of firms that are privatized can be interpreted as a possible e↵ect of the better
bidding skills of privately managed firms. Few empirical studies to date have sought to
disentangle the e↵ects of private management in an environment of oligopolistic compe-
tition. This is understandable given that the change in management of generation units
is unusual and because the number of individual units in a sample is intrinsically limited
by the nature of oligopolistic market structures. Although more empirical studies of
the impact of privatization on competition are necessary, the evidence presented in this
paper o↵ers clear insights regarding the changes in competitive behavior following the
shift to private management.
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Appendix A Parallel trends tables
Table A5: Quadratic and Linear Trends Equality Test
Bids Bids Logarithms
Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
Linear trend control -0.0115 -0.142 0.0000118 -0.000465*
(0.018) (0.092) (0.000) (0.000)
Quadratic trend control 0.0000149 5.44e-08*
(0.000) (0.000)
Linear trend TBT -0.0423 -0.241** 0.0000148 -0.000770***
(0.076) (0.078) (0.000) (0.000)
Quadratic trend TBT 0.0000247 9.74e-08**
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 93684 93684 93684 93684
Groups 29 29 29 29
F-Statistic Ho:  T1 =  
NT
1 0.16 0.68 0.00 1.02
P-Value (0.70) (0.42) (0.98) (0.32)




Note: Statistical significance at standard levels (*** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%).
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix C Details of the Marginal cost calculus
for thermal units
I computed the marginal costs of thermal plants taking account of the heat rate, fuel
costs and fuel transportation costs according to the following formula:





Heat R.i| {z }
MBTU
KWh




= Marginal Costit| {z }
COP$
kWh
Where COP are Colombian pesos, MBTU are one thousand of the British thermal
unit, US are United States dollars and KWh is one kilowatt per hour. The heat rate is
a measure of the thermal e ciency of the generation unit. It represents the quantity of
fuel measured in MBTU necessary to generate one kilowatt per hour.The parameters of
the heat rate of thermal electricity generation units were extracted from reports of the
Mines and Energy Planning Unit (UPME).
In the case of gas fired units, I use as fuel cost the price of the gas from the basin
Guajira which is the most important gas supply source for Colombian thermal genera-
tion. Since September 1995 Until August 2013, the Colombian Government regulated
the prices of gas coming from this gas source. The regulation consist in imposing a
maximum sale price of gas. This maximum price at period t, pt, is given by the formula
pt 1[indext 1/indext 2] where indext 1 is the average of the last semester of the New
York Harbor Residual Fuel Oil 1.0 % Sulfur LP Spot Price according to the series that
was published by the Energy Information Administration of the United States. A period
t is defined as semester and it changes 1st February and 1st August of each year 7.This
price is given in US dollars/MBTU.
From 2006 to 2013 I applied the Guajira regulated price calculation made and pub-
lished by the most important gas producer in the market (ECOPETROL) according to
the regulation descrpted above and converting the resulting price (US dollars/MBTU)
7The formula was established in Act 119/2005 of CREG
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to Colombian pesos/KWh.The exchange rate data were obtained from the Colombian
Central Bank (Banco de la República). The heat rate parameters of the thermal units
were extracted from the Mines and Energy Planning Unit (UPME). The fuel cost is
assumed to be the price of supply from the Guajira Well. This price was regulated by
the Regulatory Commission of Energy and Gas (CREG) until 2013. Since that date, a
periodical market mechanism has been used to clear the price of the gas of the Guajira
Well. Between 2006 and 2013, I extracted the Guajira Well price from the Regulatory
acts of CREG. For the following years, the weighted average price was calculated ac-
cording to the type of contract, based on information from the Gas Market Manager in
Colombia (BEC). Consequently, for gas units, we take as transportation costs the sum
of the fees for the use of each segment of the network necessary to transport the gas from
the Guajira Well to the generation units. The fees for the use of the segment of the gas
transmission network are regulated by the CREG and are published in regulatory acts
(CREG 70 and 125 of 2003).
For coal fired plants, the weighted average FOB export price is calculated using infor-
mation about the amount and value of thermal coal exports available in the databases of
the National Statistics Institute (DANE). The price in dollars per ton was transformed
to dollars per MBTU units, multiplying for a calorific value of the Colombian thermal
coal of 1,370 BTU per pound (Source: Regulation 2009: 180507 Colombian Ministry
of Energy and Mines). For coal transportation costs, an importation parity approach is
used, which implies that they are calculated as the reference transportation fees from the
importation port closest to the source of production. These fees were extracted from the
System of Information of E cient Costs for Road Freight Transportation, Transportation
Ministry of Colombia.
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Appendix D Robustness Checks Tables and Figures
Figure D6: Parallel trends alternative control groups
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Source: Data from XM - Calculations and elaboration: Author.
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Table D8: Random E↵ects estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bid Bid Bid Bid Ln (Bid) Ln (Bid) Ln (Bid) Ln (Bid)
Ch. to Pr. 86.17 0.18
(67.23) (0.12)
Ch.to Pr. 354.85*** 0.64***
Small to big (57.92) (0.12)
Ch. to Pr. -4.89 0.03






Small to big (132.99) (0.13)
Ch.P./C.High -18.04 -0.33**
Small to big (90.33) (0.13)
Ch.P./C.Low 118.46 0.28
New comp. (115.27) (0.21)
Ch.P./C.High -80.23 -0.53**
New comp. (143.38) (0.25)
Contracts -133.16 -133.45 0.27 0.269
Low (158.97) (159.83) (0.20) (0.19)
Marginal -2.39*** -2.30*** -1.33 -1.32 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01***
Cost (0.83) (0.86) (1.32) (1.39) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Fuel gas 376.11** 377.64** 346.59** 349.61** 1.40*** 1.407*** 1.412*** 1.427***
(156.13) (163.97) (152.77) (157.57) (0.40) (0.41) (0.41) (0.43)
AGC -171.32** -150.10** -148.85*** -146.26** -0.50** -0.47** -0.53** -0.50**
(71.69) (70.19) (54.96) (57.13) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22)
Installed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Capacity (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Forward C. -0.03 -0.06** -0.03 -0.03 -0.00** -0.00** -0.00 -0.00
2005/2006 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Energy -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
critical (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Unit FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Every Week FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 90875 90875 89608 89608 90875 90875 89608 89608
Note: Statistical significance at standard levels (*** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%).
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by generation unit.
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Table D9: Prais-Winsten estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Bid Bid Bid Bid Ln (Bid) Ln (Bid) Ln (Bid) Ln (Bid)
Ch. to Pr. 78.29*** 0.12***
(22.92) (0.03)
Ch. to P. 107.01*** 0.12***
Small to big (37.80) (0.04)
Ch. to P. 42.27** 0.11***






Small to big (34.51) (0.04)
Ch.P./C.High -74.64*** -0.10***
Small to big (16.60) (0.02)
Ch.P./C.Low 67.12*** 0.27***
New comp. (16.17) (0.03)
Ch.P./C.High -29.37 -0.25***
New comp. (24.73) (0.05)
Contracts 5.95 5.92 0.05*** 0.05***
Low (5.41) (5.40) (0.02) (0.02)
Marginal 0.19* 0.24** -0.42*** -0.36*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 -0.00
Costs (0.113) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Fuel gas 184.94*** 185.59*** 247.65*** 246.17*** 0.80*** 0.80*** 1.00*** 1.01***
(15.46) (15.35) (15.26) (15.19) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
AGC -162.18*** -157.61*** -154.35*** -149.62*** -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.39*** -0.39***
(11.31) (10.66) (10.43) (10.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Installed 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
Capacity (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Forward C. -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
2005/2006 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Energy -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00***
critical (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Unit FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Every week FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 90875 90875 89608 89608 90875 90875 89608 89608
R-sq 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.11
Note: Statistical significance at standard levels (*** at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%).
Standard errors in parentheses clustered by generation unit.
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